The performance of advisory councils (ACs): not an easy question
One of the central goals of the Assodem Project is to understand what makes advisory councils perform well. Thus, the first step is to explain what we understand as good or bad performance.
Most of the participation literature tends to develop general evaluation criteria departing from normative democratic theory, resulting in a list of potential benefits. Each participatory mechanism would aim only at one or a few of these goals (Fung 2006), and it would be unfair to evaluate them, using objectives they were not designed to deal with. For example, most ACs have not been created explicitly to promote social justice and, therefore, it does not make sense to use this as an overarching criterium against which to judge their outcomes.
Research questions
Our research tries to combine these different approaches in two dimensions. The most central concern in our framework is performance, through two main dimensions: voice and policy relevance. Any of our ACs should contribute to make 1) different social voices be heard; and 2) provide relevant inputs for policy-making.
More broadly, we are interested to cover three general research questions .
1. Who participates?
The selection of the AC’s members is a key factor because it affects the diversity of views and information inside the council (Bohman, 2006; Sunstein, 2002). The council’s initial composition determines whether it is a forum for associations, activists and interest groups dominated by an idea of representation and negotiation or it is rather a forum for non-partisan actors with an idea of representation as deliberation (Hendriks, 2006; Fung, 2006; Ganuza et al, 2013).
Political strategy can be the driving criteria for authorities when deciding the composition of an AC. As Hendriks explains, partisan actors approach these devices through an instrumental rationality that ultimately seeks to move forward their own strategic interests (Hendriks, 2006: 577). In this sense, Navarro (1999) argues that the close links between some parties and associations can generate a «participatory bias». These strategic attitudes do not only belong to politicians, but they also appear in associations, activists or interest groups. For instance, a specific interest group may decide strategically not to participate in an AC because it is unsure of achieving its interests there, or because it has better pre-existing channels for accessing institutions (Hendriks, 2006: 584). Ganuza et al (2013: 7) state that associations that have traditionally monopolized representation in a given AC may resist losing their privileged position in favor of other participants, such as non-associated citizens or political activists.
Campaign for the promotion of the participation in councils, Ayuntamiento de Torrelodones (Madrid).
2. How does the council work?
Attributing an important explanatory role to institutional design is a powerful tradition in research about participatory institutions (Delli Carpini et al, 2004: 327; Landwehr & Holzinger, 2010; Baiochi et al, 2011). Design choices have consequences for the level, bias and quality of participation.
There are several explanatory factors to analyze here. For example, having working commissions is not a guarantee that a AC will perform well, but it is at least a signal that some real activity is going on and there is interest to discuss policy details. Some recent evidence (Bherer et al, 2016) supports the idea that allowing organizations to participate in the establishment of their internal procedure (self-regulation) can be considered a reason for the well-functioning of the participatory processes.
Finally, focusing on decision-making rules, the most usual pattern combines different procedures: seeking consensus, simple majority, and dissenting votes. Nonetheless, consensus may be favoured because recommendations are more likely to be considered by the external political authority if there is a strong support behind them.
Design: John W. Tomac, 2015. Patients’ Counseling Campaign.
3. What for?
This question focuses on the ACs’ powers and competences. How does it integrate the participants’ input into the decision-making process? In most cases, these ACs rarely have a strong influence in the design of public policies, their implementation or their evaluation. Gomà & Font (2001) point out that there is a clear difference between a small number of councils with a direct impact on program design, and a large number of merely advisory councils, perceived by municipal officials as spaces for information and legitimation. In other cases, ACs are more empowered but the issues they address are scarcely relevant. A similar image comes from comparative research: councils rarely have binding decision-making (Cooper & Musso 1999: 213).
Fung expectation is that participatory processes with merely advisory functions would be ineffective (Fung, 2006: 69). On the other hand, when an AC has a direct impact on public policies their members will be more committed to use it as a forum for deliberation, negotiation and decision, and it is likely that public authorities will be pressured to provide material resources (budget, personnel, technical office, etc.) to secure that it can fulfil its functions. However, regarding this discussion, it is important to note the contrast between the more skeptical assessments of many scholars with a -sometimes- positive perception of participants. For example, this is seen in a survey study about the system of ACs in Flanders (Fobé et al. 2013) or in Barcelona (Sarasa & Guiu, 2001).
Information campaign about advisory councils in Detroit
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Associative democracy (Assodem) 